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SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
VED P. NANDA"
I. INTRODUCTION
Self-determination and secession pose major challenges for
international lawyers-the former for its ambiguity and difficulties of
operationalization and the latter for the uncertainty of its status, since
it is neither permitted nor prohibited under international law. This
essay is aimed at analyzing the concepts in a historical context.
Sections II and III will provide the context, followed by a general
discussion of self-determination. Section IV discusses the Canadian
Supreme Court's opinion on Quebec's claim unilaterally to secede;
Section V reviews two recent cases-Kosovo and East Timor. The
concluding section recommends a few criteria to be used in determining
the validity of claims to secede.
II. THE CONTEXT
President Bill Clinton's address on October 8, 1999, in Quebec,
Canada, illustrated the dilemma for U.S. foreign policy on these issues.
President Clinton said that the United States would "oppose the
breakup of Canada, a country with a relatively decent record of
observance of human rights, especially those of the Quebecois. .... "2 He
contrasted the situation in Quebec with that in East Timor, where
Indonesia's military and militia had slaughtered hundreds of innocent
civilians and forced expulsion of tens of thousands of others.3 He also
explained the United Nations invasion of Serbia, where Serbs had
oppressed a rebellious Kosovar population.4
President Clinton considered questionable the assertion that every
This is an adapted version of a presentation at the Americas' Regional Conference on
Secession and International Law, Santa Clara University School of Law, February 2001.
"Evans University Professor, Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law and Director,
International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver.
1. See Arnold Beichman, Secessions us. Praise for Unity, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 18,
1999, at A16.
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
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ethnic, religious or tribal group seeking secession should have the right
to secede. For both political and economic reasons he implicitly rejected
the creation of too many mini-states. He extolled instead the virtues of
federalism, that is, the sharing of power between a central government
and sub-national units such as states or provinces. I quote him at
length:
It seems to me that the suggestion that a people of a given ethnic group
or tribal group or religious group can only have a meaningful
communal existence if they are an independent nation - not if there is
no oppression, not if they have genuine autonomy, but they must be
actually independent - is a questionable assertion in a global economy
where cooperation pays greater benefits in every area of life than
destructive competition.... And so we have spent much of the 20th
century trying to reconcile President Woodrow Wilson's belief that
different nations had the right to be free - nations being people with a
common consciousness - had a right to be a state ....
When a people thinks it should be independent in order to have a
meaningful political existence, serious questions should be asked: Is
there an abuse of human rights? Is there a way people can get along if
they come from different heritages? Are minority rights, as well as
majority rights, respected? What is in the long-term economic and
security interests of our people? How are we going to cooperate with
our neighbors? Will it be better or worse if we are independent, or if
we have a federalist system?...
And the practical knowledge that we all have that if every racial and
ethnic and religious group that occupies a significant piece of land not
occupied between others became a separate nation - we might have 800
countries in the world and have a very difficult time having a
functioning economy or a functioning global polity. Maybe we would
have 8,000 - how low can you go?
President Clinton's rhetoric notwithstanding, his message was that
the right to self-determination, perhaps resulting in secession, was
appropriate in Yugoslavia and Indonesia, both authoritarian societies,
but not in a democratic Canada.
A year earlier, the Supreme Court of Canada had responded to a
Reference from the government of Canada on whether Quebec had the
right to unilateral secession under Canadian constitutional law and
international law.6 The advisory opinion rendered by the Court will be
analyzed later, but it will suffice here to note the Court's conclusion
5. Arnold Beichman, Secessions vs. Praise for Unity, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1999, at
A16.
6. See Supreme Court of Canada: Reference Re Secession of Quebec, reprinted in 37
I.L.M. 1340 (1998).
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that under international law neither the National Assembly, nor the
legislature, nor the government of Quebec could claim the right to
secede unilaterally from Canada. The Court observed that under the
international law principle of self-determination of peoples, a right to
secede arises only where "a people" is governed in a colonial setting,
where "a people" is subject to alien subjugation, domination or
exploitation, and possibly where "a people" is denied within the state of
which it forms a part a meaningful exercise of its right to self-
determination.7
It should be noted that, despite President Clinton's clear statement,
the United States finds it hard to espouse or implement a consistent
policy on sub-nationalism, or the "right" of self-determination. To
illustrate, there has been no support for the Tibetans seeking
independence from China, the Kurds seeking to establish the
independent state of Kurdistan, and people in Aceh, once an
independent kingdom in Sumatra and now part of Indonesia, seeking
independence from Jakarta for the past three decades, although each of
these claims is based on purported flagrant human rights violations.
Perhaps Russia's use of force in Chechnya has raised similarly difficult
issues.
And as to President Woodrow Wilson's declaration regarding the
right of self-determination, as noted by President Clinton, one must
recall Wilson's Secretary of State, Robert Lansing's, warning about the
"danger of... such ideas." In his often-cited words, "the phrase is
loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes that can never be realized. It
will, I fear, cost thousands of lives.... What calamity that the phrase
was ever uttered! What misery it will cause!"8 The continuing validity
of that statement, made originally in connection with the Versailles
Peace Conference at the end of World War I, is self-evident, as the
world community is daily confronted with ethnic and national self-
determination claims.
III. WHAT DOES SELF-DETERMINATION MEAN?
A. Introduction
The concept is multi-faceted. To illustrate, a claim may be to
external self-determination (the establishment of a sovereign and
independent state, the free association or integration with an
independent state, or the emergence into any other political status
freely determined by a people) and/or internal self-determination (the
7. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 6, at 1370, para. 154.
8. ROBERT LANSING, THE PEACE INITIATIVES - PERSONAL NARRATIVE 97 (1921),
quoted in ALFRED COBBAN, NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 19 (1945).
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pursuit of a people's political, economic and social development within
the framework of an existing state). Questions of federalism, devolution
and autonomy can also arise. In one of its incarnations-in the colonial
context-the principle was constantly and successfully invoked in the
post-World War II period. The period of de-colonization attests to its
dynamism. Since then, it has been increasingly invoked again as a
right.
It should be noted that the concept is still invoked at the United
Nations by the Special Committee of 24 on Decolonization. At its
October 1999 session,9 the Committee advocated the right of self-
determination by the people of the Non-Self-Governing Territories. In
the general debate, most speakers urged the administering Powers to
facilitate visiting missions and to address programs to promote the
political, social, economic, educational and human development of the
Non-Self-Governing Territories. They said that the right of the Non-
Self-Governing Territories to self-determination remained unfulfilled,
emphasizing unjust treatment of indigenous peoples and the slow
progress toward self-government."
The representative of Spain said that the principle should not
always be applied.". He was referring to the case of Gibraltar, which, he
said, could not be a nation with sovereign rights, for decolonization
there had been achieved through restoration of the territorial integrity
of Spain.'
Similarly, the representative of Morocco said that Western Sahara
was not a problem of colonization but rather a question of territorial
integrity. 3  While Morocco had no objection to the referendum in
Western Sahara, it asserted that the rights of the whole population
must be respected.'
The difficulty in the non-colonial context is primarily one of
reconciling the principle of "uti possiditis, ita possiditis" (rough
translation: "you may keep what you had"), which protects the borders
of colonies achieving independence with self-determination, if it is read
to authorize secession. This is principally because of the sacrosanct
quality of the principle of territorial integrity enshrined in the U.N.
Charter and embraced by states and international intergovernmental
organizations-the U.N. and regional organizations-alike.
9. For a summary report, see U.N. Special Political and Decolonization Committee
Concludes General Debate, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 8, 1999.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
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B. International Legal Pronouncements
Article 1 of the United Nations Charter states the principle of
"equal rights and self-determination of peoples" as among the purposes
of the United Nations.15 At the same time, Article 2 enumerates as one
of the principles, in accordance with which the U.N. and its Members
are to pursue, that "[aill Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."6
As Professor Cassese states, the principle of self-determination has
become so widely recognized in international conventions that it may be
considered a general principle of international law, conferring on the
people the right to self-determination." Aside from the second
paragraph of Article 1 mentioned previously, the United Nations
Charter embodies the idea self-determination in Article 55,"8 and it is
further enshrined in Article 1 of both the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights'9 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights."
The principle of self-determination has also been addressed in
several U.N. resolutions, declarations and conventions. To illustrate,
the United Nations General Assembly's 1970 Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
(the "Friendly Relations Declaration") states:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples
have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their
political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural
development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter.2'
15. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 2.
16. U.N. CHARTER,SUpra note 15, at art. 2, para. 4.
17. A. CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 171-72
(1995).
18. U.N. CHARTER,SUpra note 15, at art. 55.
19. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 1, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360, 369 (1967).
20. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), Annex, pt. 1, art. 1, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 165,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
21. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
[Hereinafter Friendly Relations Doctrine].
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The Declaration obligates a State to refrain from any forcible action
that deprives people claiming the right to self-determination of the
exercise of such right. On the issue of territorial integrity, the
Declaration states:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing
or encouraging any action which will dismember or impair, totally or in
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of people ... and thus
possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to
22the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.
The logical reading is that, to be entitled to protection of its
territorial integrity against secession, a State must possess a
government representing the whole people.
A similar statement was adopted ten years earlier by the U.N.
General Assembly in its Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and People.2 In 1993 the United Nations World
Conference on Human Rights adopted the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, reaffirming Article 1 of the two international
covenants mentioned above. 24  Finally, the U.N. General Assembly's
Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United
Nations emphasizes the right to self-determination by providing that
U.N. Member States will, inter alia,
[c]ontinue to reaffirm the right of self-determination of all peoples,
taking into account the particular situation of peoples under colonial or
other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, and recognize
the right of peoples to take legitimate action in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations to realize their inalienable right of self-
determination. This shall not be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action that would dismember or impair, totally or in
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus
possessed of a Government representing the whole people belonging to
the territory without distinction of any kind.25
Among other international legal instruments, the Final Act of the
22. Id. at 124.
23. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People,
G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66-67, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960).
24. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, pt. I, art. 2, U.N. GAOR, 48th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Conf.157/23 (1993).
25. G.A. Res. 50/6, U.N. GAOR, 50' Sess. Agenda Item 29, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/6
(1995).
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Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should be
mentioned, which states:
The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and
their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and
with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating
to territorial integrity of States.
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to
determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political
status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their
26political, economic, social and cultural development.
C. The Claim of the Katangese Peoples to Independence
In 1992 the President of the Katangese Peoples' Congress
requested the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights to:
-recognize the Katangese Peoples' Congress as a liberation movement
entitled to support in the achievement of independence for Katanga;
-recognize the independence of Katanga;
-help secure the evacuation of Zaire from Katanga. 2
The Commission ruled on this request in 1995. In denying the
request, the African Commission said that the claim had no merit under
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, since there was no
evidence of violations of any rights under the African Charter. In its
words, the Commission noted that:
In the absence of concrete evidence of violations of human rights to the
point that the territorial integrity of Zaire should be called to question
and in the absence of evidence that the people of Katanga are denied
the right to participate in Government as guaranteed by Article 13(1)
of the African Charter, the Commission holds the view that Katanga is
obliged to exercise a variant of self-determination that is compatible
with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire.28
26. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act (Helsinki Final
Act), art. VIII, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1295 (1975).
27. AFRICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS, Eighth Annual Activity
Report of the Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 31' Sess., Case 75/92,
Katangese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire, para. 1 (1995).
28. Id. at para. 6.
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D. Quebec's Claim to Secede
In its opinion on Quebec's claim to secede unilaterally from
Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada stated, "international law
expects that the right to self-determination will be exercised by peoples
within the framework of existing sovereign states and consistently with
the maintenance of the territorial integrity of those states. Where this
is not possible, in the exceptional circumstance ... a right of secession
may arise."29 While the next section analyzes the Court's opinion, one
more statement by the Court will be noted here:
There is no necessary incompatibility between the maintenance of the
territorial integrity of existing states, including Canada, and the right
of a "people" to achieve a full measure of self-determination. A state
whose government represents the whole of the people or peoples
resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and without
discrimination, and respects the principles of self-determination in its
own internal arrangements, is entitled to the protection under
international law of its territorial integrity."
E. The Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia's Opinions on
Boundaries of Successor States
In the aftermath of the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, the boundaries of the successor states became a critical
issue. The European Community initially endorsed the uti possiditis
principle.3 1 Subsequently, the European Community (EC) Arbitration
Commission on Yugoslavia (the Badinter Commission on Borders)
provided the legal justification for the EC's position. In Opinion No. 3,
the Commission responded to a question asked by the chairman of the
EC Conference on Yugoslavia, "Can the internal boundaries between
Croatia and Serbia and between Bosnia and Herzgovina and Serbia be
regarded as frontiers in terms of public international law?"32 The
Badinter Commission on Borders advised that, following the secession
of four of the Yugoslavian Federation's republics, former internal
federal borders would become international borders for seceding entities
once they received international recognition as states.33 These borders
29. Reference Re Secession, supra note 6, at 1370, para. 122.
30. Reference Re Secession, supra note 6, at 1372, para. 130.
31. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Declaration on Yugoslavia, Aug. 27, 1991, reproduced in
YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH DOCUMENTS: FROM ITS CREATION TO ITS DISSOLUTION 333-34
(Snezana Trifunovska ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1994).
32. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions
Arising from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 3, January 11, 1992, reprinted in
31 I.L.M. 1488, 1499 (1992).
33. Id.; see also European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and Guidelines on
the Recognition of New States, U.N. Doc. S/23293, Annexes 1 & 2 (1991), reprinted in 31
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would be internationally protected and neither internal nor external
borders could be changed by the use of force.
The Badinter Commission on Borders justified its response by
reference to the principle of territorial integrity of existing
internationally recognized states and the principle of uti possiditis.
Professor Peter Radan has persuasively argued that the Badinter
Commission on Borders erred in applying these principles to
Yugoslavia's border issues.' The principle of territorial integrity was
inapplicable because federal Yugoslavia's internal borders were not
international borders and also because a prerequisite for the application
of the principle is that the borders be established by treaty or
agreement.& The principle of uti possiditis would also be inapplicable to
the resolution of the dispute in question-whether existing colonial
borders should become future international borders - because, an
"[a]greement that existing colonial borders were to be international
borders was a precondition to the application of uti possidetis juris in
the decolonization context in Latin America and Africa."36 The Badinter
Commission on Borders' response left unanswered the question whether
uti possiditis applies only to questions of dissolution of states or also to
situations of secession. As Professor Radan suggests, the Badinter
Commission on Borders should have employed a more flexible approach
in the case of secession from federal states.7
The Badinter Commission on Borders especially noted that its
reading was made in the context of Yugoslavia's being "in the process of
dissolution," a situation that the Court had already found in its Opinion
No. 1. This response was given to a question whether Yugoslavia had
disintegrated or the republics had seceded. The Commission said that
when the organs of a federal state do not meet the "criteria of
participation and representativeness inherent in a federal state," when
violence is prevalent, when the federal authorities fail to "enforce
respect for ... cease-fire agreements," and when the republics express
their wish to be independent, a federal state is under these
circumstances "in the process of dissolution." I submit that this
statement is overly broad; it lacks precision and fails to provide
I.L.M. 1485, 1486 (1992); see also International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
Documentation on the Arbitration Commission Under the UN/EC Geneva Conference:
Advisory Opinions Nos. 11-15 of the Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 11, July 16,
1993, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1586, 1587 (1993).
34. Peter Radan, Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical Analysis of the
Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission, 24 MELB. U. L. REv. 50, 53 (2000).
35. Radan, supra note 34, at 58.
36. Id. at 65; see generally id. at 59-65.
37. Id. at 74-76.
38. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions
Arising from the Disintegration of Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1488,
1494 - 1497 (1992).
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workable guidelines as to when parts of a federation may secede or
when the federation is "in the process of dissolution."
In Opinion No. 2 the question asked was whether the Serbs in
Croatia and Bosnia had the right to self-determination. The
Commission acknowledged a lack of clarity in international law on the
subject, but added, however, that it was nonetheless clear that any such
right "must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of
independence (uti possiditis juris) except where the states . .. could
agree otherwise."39 Here again the Commission failed to provide
guidance on what kind of self-determination rights the Serbs could have
in Croatia and Bosnia. It equated the right to self-determination solely
to secession and changes in boundaries, and thus lost an opportunity to
clarify alternatives to secession as a valid exercise of self-determination.
Perhaps the Commission could have recommended a negotiated
redrawing of the boundaries of Yugoslavia based upon plebiscites under
international supervision. This may have provided peaceable resolution
of the dispute and avoided the years of bloody civil war that followed.
Since this was not a colonial situation, the Commission's invocation of
the concept of uti possiditis juris was not appropriate.
F. Appraisal
The normative scope of the principle of self-determination lacks
precision. Specifically, it is unclear first whether the definition of
"peoples" includes ethnic minorities and second what the appropriate
remedy for a claim of self-determination should be - creation of a
sovereign independent state, free association with an independent
state, integration with an independent state, or any other political
status freely determined, as stated in the Friendly Relations
Declaration. °
It is, however, often asserted that the exercise of the right of self-
determination should normally not violate the "territorial integrity" of a
state, that the right is normally to be exercised within the framework of
existing sovereign states, assuming that the government represents the
people. Consequently, secession as a remedy may be available only in
exceptional circumstances involving gross breaches of fundamental
human rights.4'
Professor Allen Buchanan is the leading proponent of the position
that secession is a remedial right that can be exercised only in
exceptional circumstances when there is clear evidence that groups
39. See Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions
Arising from the Disintegration of Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 2, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1488,
1497-1499 (1992).
40. Friendly Relations Doctrine, supra note 21.
41. Prof. Cassese suggests this formulation. See supra, note 17, at 108-25.
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have suffered certain kinds of injustices. 2 He argues that secessionists'
claims can be valid only against a state that fails to act as a "trustee for
the people, conceived of as an intergenerational community."43 Implicit
in this argument is the suggestion that such claims cannot be valid
against a democratic state in which basic individual rights may be
exercised.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA'S PRONOUNCEMENT ON QUEBEC'S
CLAIM TO SECEDE"
The Supreme Court of Canada responded to References from the
Governor in Council on three questions related to the unilateral
secession of Quebec from Canada. The first question related to the
Constitutional capacity of the National Assembly, legislature or
government of Quebec to effect the unilateral secession of Quebec from
Canada. The second question related to the role of international law in
authorizing these bodies to so act. The third question was, "In the
event of a conflict between domestic and international law on the right
of the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec to effect
the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally, which would take
precedence in Canada?" 
In responding to the first question, the Court considered whether
Quebec has a right to unilateral secession. It stated that "a clear
majority vote in Quebec on a clear question in favour of secession would
confer democratic legitimacy on the secession initiative which all of the
other participants in Confederation would have to recognize."4 It
added, however:
Quebec could not, despite a clear referendum result, purport to invoke
a right of self-determination to dictate the terms of a proposed
secession to the other parties to the federation. The democratic vote,
by however strong a majority, would have no legal effect on its own and
could not push aside the principles of federalism and the rule of law,
the rights of individuals and minorities, or the operation of democracy
42. See ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM
FORT SUMTER To LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC (1991) for his earlier work favoring group
rights [hereinafter POLITICAL DIVORCE]. More recently, however, he argues for a pretty
restrictive approach. See, e.g., Allen Buchanan, Democracy and Secession, in NATIONAL
SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 14 (M. Moore ed., 1998); Allen Buchanan, What's
So Special About Nations?, in RETHINKING NATIONALISM 283 (CAN. J. PHIL., Supp. Vol.
22, 1998).
43. POLITICAL DIVORCE, supra note 42, at 9.
44. See Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 6.
45. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 6, at 1342.
46. Id. at para. 150. I have cited from the Court's Conclusions because of their
precision. For a detailed discussion of these issues elaborated in the Court's opinion, see
id. at 1348-75.
2001
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLYV
in the other provinces or in Canada as a whole. Democratic rights
under the Constitution cannot be divorced from Constitutional
obligations. Nor, however, can the reverse proposition be accepted.
The continued existence and operation of the Canadian Constitutional
order could not be indifferent to a clear expression of a clear majority of
Quebecers that they no longer wish to remain in Canada. The other
provinces and the federal government would have no basis to deny the
right of the government of Quebec to pursue secession should a clear
majority of the people of Quebec choose that goal, so long as in doing
so, Quebec respects the rights of others. The negotiations that followed
such a vote would address the potential act of secession as well as its
possible terms should in fact secession proceed. There would be no
conclusions predetermined by law on any issue. Negotiations would
need to address the interests of the other provinces, the federal
government, Quebec and indeed the rights of all Canadians both within
and outside Quebec, and specifically the rights of minorities .
As to the nature of negotiations, the Court acknowledged that:
[wihile the negotiators would have to contemplate the possibility of
secession, there would be no absolute legal entitlement to it and no
assumption that an agreement reconciling all relevant rights and
obligations would actually be reached. It is foreseeable that even
negotiations carried out in conformity with the underlying
constitutional principles could reach an impasse. We need not
speculate here as to what would then transpire. Under the
Constitution, secession requires that an amendment be negotiated.4
On the second question, in which the Court was asked to consider
whether a right to unilateral secession exists under international law,
the Court said that it did not need to decide the "people" issue in the
context of Quebec-the basis of the right to self-determination being
that it belongs to all "peoples"-for a right to secession only arises in a
colonial context or "where 'a people' is subject to alien subjugation,
domination or exploitation; and possibly where 'a people' is denied any
meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of
which it forms a part."9 It added:
In other circumstances, peoples are expected to achieve self-
determination within the framework of their existing state. A state
whose government represents the whole of the people or peoples
resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and without
discrimination, and respects the principles of self-determination in its
internal arrangements, is entitled to maintain its territorial integrity
under international law and to have that territorial integrity
recognized by other states. Quebec does not meet the threshold of a
47. Id. at para. 151.
48. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 6, at para. 97.
49. Id. at para. 154.
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colonial people or an oppressed people, nor can it be suggested that
Quebecers have been denied meaningful access to government to
pursue their political, economic, cultural and social development. In
the circumstances, the National Assembly, the legislature or the
government of Quebec do[es] not enjoy a right at international law to
effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally.50
After having rejected the contention that Quebec has a unilateral
right to secede, the Court pronounced the "Effectivity" principle, that is,
that regardless of the legality of the steps leading to the creation of a
reality, reality counts and a de facto secession may result." Thus, the
Court acknowledged that "international law may well, depending on the
circumstances, adapt to recognize a political and/or factual reality."52
The Court explained:
Although there is no right, under the Constitution or at international
law, to unilateral secession, that is secession without negotiation on
the basis just discussed, this does not rule out the possibility of an
unconstitutional declaration of secession leading to a de facto
secession. The ultimate success of such a secession would be
dependent on recognition by the international community, which is
likely to consider the legality and legitimacy of secession having regard
to, amongst other facts, the conduct of Quebec and Canada, in
determining whether to grant or withhold recognition. Such
recognition, even if granted, would not, however, provide any
retroactive justification for the act of secession, either under the
Constitution of Canada or at international law .53
On the third question, the Court said that "there is no conflict
between domestic and international law to be addressed in the context
of this Reference."'
To summarize the Court's contribution to the ongoing discourse on
secession, three points are to be noted: one, the Court advised that
Quebec does not have the right to unilaterally secede, although it
clarified the situations in which the right would be present; two, the
Court announced the "Effectivity" principle; and three by linking
democratic rights and constitutional obligations, the Court
acknowledged that after a "clear expression of a clear majority of
Quebecers that they no longer wish to remain in Canada,"5 negotiations
could follow on the issue of secession. It, however, suggested that the
outcome of any negotiated settlement would be a step in the direction of
50. Id.
51. Id. at para. 140.
52. Id. at para. 141.
53. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 6, at para. 155.
54. Id. at para. 147.
55. See supra note 6, at 1344.
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amending the Canadian Constitution. Thus, the appropriate provisions
of the Canadian Constitution, the 1982 Constitution Act,56 would apply.
This would require resolutions by the House of Commons and Senate
and by the legislative assemblies of at least two-thirds of the provinces
that have, in aggregate, at least fifty percent of the population of all the
provinces.
Subsequent to the 1998 Supreme Court consideration of Quebec's
claim to secede, the Parliament of Canada passed the Clarity Acts to
define the wording of a question in any future referendum on a
province's sovereignty by stating that "the House of Commons shall
consider whether the question would result in a clear expression of the
will of the population of a province on whether the province should
cease to be part of Canada and become an independent state."5 9 The Act
also determines the majority threshold for such a decision as it states:
In considering whether there has been a clear expression of a will by a
clear majority of the population of a province that the province cease to
be part of Canada, the House of Commons shall take into account:
(a) the size of the majority of valid votes cast in favour of the
secessionist option;
(b) the percentage of eligible voters voting in the referendum; and
c) any other matters or circumstances it considers to be relevant.60
It is only upon satisfaction of these conditions that the government
is to "enter into negotiations on the terms which a province might cease
to be part of Canada." For its part, the National Assembly of Quebec
in December 2000 enacted an independent declaration setting out for
the people and province of Quebec an affirmation of their freedom to
determine their future and to adopt measures to legally establish this
freedom. It provides that, "[wihen the Quebec people is consulted by
way of referendum under the Referendum Act, the winning option is the
option that obtains a majority of the valid votes cast, namely fifty
56. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11, s. 43, 135 C. Gaz. 41, part 1 (relating to "any alteration to boundaries between
provinces").
57. Id. at s. 38(1)(a) and (b).
58. Clarity Act, ch. 26, S.C. 2000, 135 C. Gaz. 41, part I (Can.) (giving effect to the
requirements for clarity as set out in the Opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Quebec Secession Reference). [Hereinafter Clarity Act].
59. Id. at s. 1(3).
60. Clarity Act, supra note 58, at s. 2(2).
61. Id. at s. 2(4).
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percent of the valid votes cast plus one. ' 6 The Clarity Act and this Act
are obviously on a collision course. Stay tuned.
III. SELF-DETERMINATION IN Kosovo AND EAST TIMOR
A. Kosovo
The nineteen-member North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
intervened militarily in Kosovo, a province of Serbia, in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, in the first intervention of its kind undertaken
by the Alliance.6 Only pertinent aspects of that operation relating to
the topic under discussion will be recounted here.
The Autonomous Province of Kosovo was granted special autonomy
under the 1974 Constitution, which was later revoked in 1988-89
through constitutional changes under President Slobodon Milosevic.
Milosevic's repressive policies led to the eventual crisis in Kosovo and
NATO intervention. 4  The so-called "Contact Group," comprising
France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, along with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Council, and eventually the U.N.
Security Council, became involved in discussions on resolving the
deepening crisis. In March 1998, the Group proposed a comprehensive
arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), including
Kosovo.'
Then on March 31, 1998, the U.N. Security Council adopted
Resolution 1160 under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter expressing "its
support for an enhanced status for Kosovo which would include a
substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-
administration," and accepting the proposal by the Contact Group that
the Kosovo problem should be solved on the principle of the territorial
integrity of Yugoslavia.' The resolution threatened additional
measures in case of the "failure to make constructive progress towards
the peaceful resolution of the situation in Kosovo."r7
The Security Council's request went unheeded, and, as the
humanitarian situation further deteriorated, the Council, acting again
62. Bill 99, ch. I, (4), S.Q. 46 (2000).
63. See generally Ved P. Nanda, NATO's Armed Intervention in Kosovo and
International Law, 10 U.S.A.F.A. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-25 (1999/2000).
64. See generally GREG CAMPBELL, THE ROAD To KOSOVO: A BALKAN DIARY
(Westview Press 2000); JULIE A. MERTUS, KosOVO: How MYTHS AND TRUTHS STARTED A
WAR (U. Cal. Press 1999).
65. U.N. Doc. S/1998/223 (1998); See also U.N. Doc. S/1998/272 (1998).
66. S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3868th mtg. at para. 5, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1160 (1998).
67. Id. at para. 19.
2001 319
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLYV
under Chapter VII, adopted Resolution 1199, which demanded that the
parties cease hostilities and, "enter immediately into a meaningful
dialogue without preconditions and with international involvement, and
to a clear timetable, leading to an end of the crisis and to a negotiated
political solution to the issue of Kosovo."' It called upon Yugoslavia to
facilitate "the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their
homes and allow free and unimpeded access for humanitarian
organizations and supplies to Kosovo."69
The situation grew worse. After several warnings and attempts at
negotiation, the Security Council, acting again under Chapter VII,
adopted Resolution 1203 on October 24, 1998, aimed at protecting
unarmed monitors who were overseeing the cease-fire from the
ground."0
Clashes between Serb forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army
guerillas intensified. Negotiations were held in Rambouillet, outside
Paris, from February 6 to 23, 1999, and a second round in Paris from
March 15 to 18, leading to the proposed Rambouillet Accords.7' Under
the Accords, the framework of basic principles was founded on the
maintenance of territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and political autonomy for Kosovo.72 President Milosevic,.
however, refused to accept the plan, which contemplated the
establishment of a multinational implementation force with NATO at
its core.73 He also rejected the mechanism for the final settlement for
Kosovo, to be determined by an international meeting three years into
the future, convened primarily "on the basis of the will of the people" of
Kosovo. 74 Clearly he realized that the ninety-percent majority ethnic
Albanians would be the ones to determine Kosovo's status. Although
the Kosovo Albanian delegation ultimately signed the proposed peace
agreement, the Serbs did not.0
The Serbs made it clear that they were not going to negotiate
further nor comply with any existing agreements and moved greater
force into Kosovo, initiating their offensive against the ethnic Albanian
68. S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3930th mtg. at para. 3, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1199 (1998).
69. Id. at para. 4(c).
70. S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3937th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203
(1998); see John M. Goshko, UN. Council Backs Kosovo Pact, Clears Way for NATO
Intervention, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1998, at A28.
71. Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, Feb. 23, 1999,
available at http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/dossiers/kosovo/rambouillet.html (last
visited Oct. 31, 2001). [Hereinafter Interim Agreement].
72. Id. at ch. 1, art. 1.
73. Interim Agreement, supra note 71, at ch. 7, art 1, para. 1(b).
74. Id. at ch. 8, art. 1, para. 3.
75. See, e.g., NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo, available at
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2001).
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Kosovars. Considering their effectiveness thwarted by the Serbs, the
OSCE withdrew its verification mission on March 20. Envoy Richard
Holbrooke tried one last time to coax Milosevic to sign the Rambouilet
Accords on March 22, but this, too, failed, and NATO launched its air
campaign, "Operation Allied Force," against Serbia the following day."6
The war dragged on for eleven weeks. Efforts at finding a political
solution culminated on May 6, 1999, when the foreign ministers of the
Group of Eight met in Bonn, Germany, and agreed on a set of principles
to move toward a resolution of the Kosovo crisis."
The Security Council ultimately resolved that the political solution
to the Kosovo crisis would be based on the general principles adopted by
the Group of Eight foreign ministers, 8 which included, along with an
immediate and verifiable end to the violence and repression in Kosovo:
the withdrawal of military forces from Kosovo; the establishment of an
interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the U.N. Security
Council, and the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced
persons to Kosovo; and a political process toward the establishment of
an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial
self government for Kosovo based on the principles of sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. 
79
B. East Timor
The events in East Timor that led to the establishment of a
multinational intervention force led by Australia are well known.
Indonesia had used oppressive means for several years to quash all
dissent to its occupation after the Portuguese left East Timor. Its
military and militias had carried out a reign of terror. The important
point for the present discussion is that eventually it was only with
Indonesia's consent that the United Nations undertook a plebiscite,
which finally led to East Timor's independence.
The U.N. General Assembly listed East Timor as a non-self-
governing territory while it was a Portuguese colony, rejecting
Portugal's contention that it was one of its "overseas provinces."" In
76. See id. See also Editorial, The Rationale for Air Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,
1999, at A26, col. 1; Jane Perlez, Conflict in the Balkans: The Overview; NATO Authorizes
Bomb Strikes; Primakov, In Air, Skips U.S. Visit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1999, at Al, col. 6.
77. U.N. Doc. S/1999/516 (1999) [hereinafter Group of Eight Principles]. For an
excerpt from the statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Group of Eight, see also AP,
Group of Eight's Kosovo Statement, May 6, 1999, available at
http-//www.nytimes.com/library/world/europe/050799kosovo-g8-text.html (last visited
Nov. 3, 2001).
78. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RESJ1244
(1999).
79. Group of Eight Principles, supra note 776.
80. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1807 (XVII), U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 1149th mtg., U.N. Doc.
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December 1975, the Indonesian military invaded East Timor, occupied
the territory, and began to integrate it into Indonesia, a move
condemned by the General Assembly in its Resolution 3485 of
December 12, 1975.1 Ten days later, the Security Council adopted
another similar resolution, recognizing "the inalienable right of the
people of East Timor to self-determination and independence" and
calling upon the government of Indonesia "to withdraw without delay
all its forces from the Territory."82
After the Indonesian Parliament incorporated Timor as Indonesia's
twenty-seventh province, effective July 17, 1976, the General Assembly
rejected Indonesia's claim of having integrated it into Indonesia, in a
resolution adopted in December, 1976, since the people had not freely
exercised their right to self-determination.83 The General Assembly
continued reiterating its position in resolutions until 1982.M The U.N.
Secretary-General, however, continued his consultations with Indonesia
and Portugal for a comprehensive settlement of the problem.
Eventually, in May 1999, a set of agreements was concluded variously
between Indonesia, Portugal, and the United Nations.85
The first agreement, between Indonesia and Portugal, provided for
a request to the Secretary-General to put a proposal for special
autonomy for the East Timorese people through a "popular
consultation" process. However, if the people voted against the
proposal, arrangements would be made to transfer authority in East
Timor to the United Nations and the Secretary-General would institute
a transition process leading towards independence. The second was a
tripartite agreement that Indonesia and Portugal signed with the
United Nations regarding modalities for the popular consultation of
East Timorese through a direct ballot.'
A/5217 (1962).
81. G.A. Res. 3485, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, 2439th Mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/10034 (1975). The resolution deplored "the military intervention of the armed forces of
Indonesia in Portuguese Timor," calling for an immediate withdrawal so as "to enable the
people of the Territory freely to exercise their right to self-determination and
independence."
82. S.C. Res. 384, U.N. SCOR, 30th Sess., 1869th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Agenda/I869
(1975).
83. G.A. Res. 31/53, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 125, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/31/35 (1975).
84. The last of these was G.A. Res. 37/30, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at
227, U.N. Doc. A1RES/37/30 (1982).
85. Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on
the Question of East Timor, May 5, 1999, U.N. SCOR, 53"' Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1999/513,
Annex 1 (1999); Agreement Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of the
East Timorese Through a Direct Ballot, May 5, 1999, U.N. SCOR, 53' Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/1999/513, Annex II (1999); East Timor Popular Consultation, May 5, 1999, U.N. SCOR,
53' Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1999/513, Annex III (1999).
86. East Timor Popular Consultation, May 5, 1999, U.N. SCOR, 53'" Sess., U.N. Doc.
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The popular consultation occurred on August 30, 1999, and, despite
a great deal of harassment by pro-integration Indonesian "militias," the
voters overwhelmingly favored independence, with approximately
ninety-eight percent of those registered voting with 21.5 percent for
autonomy and 78.5 percent for independence."' This was followed by
widespread violence waged by the militias with support of Indonesian
military forces, resulting in many casualties, and eventually Indonesia's
willingness to accept assistance from the international community.
The Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1264, in
which it expressed concern with reports of flagrant violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law in East Timor."
And, after determining that Chapter VII applied, the Council
authorized the establishment of a multinational force-the
International Force for East Timor-under a unified command
structure, "to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and
support UNAMET [United Nations Mission in East Timor] in carrying
out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian
assistance operations. . . .89 States participating in the force were
authorized by the Security Council "to take all necessary measures to
fulfill this mandate."90 Australia led the force. 91
Subsequently, on October 25, 1999, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1272, again acting under Chapter VII,' under which it
decided to establish a United Nations Transitional Administration in
East Timor (UNTAET), "which will be empowered to exercise all
legislative and executive authority, including the administration of
justice."' , The UNTAET's task has not been easy, since the task
amounts to that of "nation-building," in the absence of any preexisting
institutions there.9
After her visit to East Timor, Professor Ruth Wedgwood criticized
the UNTAET's operation. She wrote that "the U.N. has
underperformed and is still unprepared for the long-term security
S/1999/513, Annex III (1999); Agreement Regarding the Modalities for the Popular
Consultation of the East Timorese Through a Direct Ballot, May 5, 1999, U.N. SCOR, 53'
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1999/513, Annex 11 (1999).
87. Press Release, United Nations, Assembly Hails Onset of East Timor's Transition
to Independence; Creates New Haiti Mission, Calls on Afghan Parties for Dialogue (Dec.
17, 1999), U.N. Doc. GA/9691 (1999).
88. S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4045th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264
(1999).
89. Id. at para. 3.
90. Id.
91. S.C. Res. 1264, supra note 88, at 2.
92. S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 54' Sess., 4057 Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999).
93. Id. at para. 1.
94. James Traub, Inventing East Timor, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, at 74 (Jul./Aug. 2000).
2001
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLYV
dilemma of that isolated nation of one million people."95 However, it
seems obvious that the goals of nation-building-establishing
democratic institutions and ensuring political stability and economic
viability-cannot be reached over a short period of time.
East Timor's long-awaited first democratic election was held on
August 30, 2001 for an 88-member assembly that will draw up East
Timor's first constitution in preparation for independence in 2002.9
More than ninety percent of registered voters cast ballots.9 7  On
September 10, the United Nations electoral commission approved the
vote as "free and fair."" The U.N. Transitional Administrator for the
territory, Sergio Vieira de Mello, said, "Henceforward, East Timor will
have an elected representative body working for the people to frame a
Constitution that is of the people... [Until the new government is
formed,] an East Timorese Council of Ministers will rule the territory
under United Nations sponsorship.""
VI. CONCLUSION
As a concept, self-determination is undoubtedly complex .and
difficult to operationalize, although much has been written on the
distinction between internal and external self-determination and as to
who constitutes "a people" able to exercise the right." Thus, the
challenge for international lawyers is to clarify the normative content of
the concept.
The difficulty of giving effect to the concept of self-determination is
illustrated by the unheeded claims of many minority and indigenous
groups on the ground that establish that their identity is not being
protected by the state. The 1994 Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples'o and the various recent declarations on the rights
95. Ruth Wedgwood, Letter to the Editor, Trouble in Timor, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, at 197
(Nov./Dec. 2000).
96. See generally World; in Brief, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2001, at A22; see also Seth
Mydans, East Timorese Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2001, sec. 4, at 2, col. 4.
97. Seth Mydans, East Timorese Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2001, sec. 4, at 2, col. 4.
98. Seth Mydans, U.N. Certifies First Election in the Newly Born East Timor, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2001, at A15, col. 5.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Eric Kolodner, Essay: The Future of the Right to Self-Determination, 10
CONN. J. INT'L L. 153 (1994); Ruth L. Gana, Which 'Self'? Race and Gender in the Right to
Self-Determination as a Prerequisite to the Right to Development, 14 WIS. INT'L L.J. 133
(1995); Jon M. Van Dyke, Carmen Di Amore-Siah, Gerald W. Berkley-Coates, Self-
Determination for Nonself-governing Peoples and for Indigenous Peoples: The Cases of
Guam and Hawaii, 18 HAWAII L. REV. 623 (1996), Michele L. Radin, The Right to
Development as a Mechanism for Group Autonomy: Protection of Tibetan Cultural Rights,
68 WASH. L. REV. 695 (1993).
101. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994).
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of minorities, such as the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,"°'
the Council of Europe's 1995 Framework Convention Regarding the
Rights of National Minorities,"°3 and the earlier 1991 Report of the
Conference on Security and Co-operation (now Organization of Security
and Co-operation in Europe) Committee of Experts on National
Minorities, ' " attest to the world community's insistence that these
groups have the right to the protection of their identities and that they
have the opportunity to participate effectively in the political and
economic life of their states to develop their culture, language, religion,
traditions and customs.
As to external self-determination and the claim to secession and an
independent state, it is fair to conclude that the United Nations and its
member states do not support claims for unilateral secession. The
latest developments, especially after Kosovo and East Timor, and in the
light of the Canadian Supreme Court's pronouncement relating to the
claim for Quebec's secession, however, indicate that there could be
exceptional circumstances which might lead to the acceptance of a claim
to unilateral secession. One such exception on which there is
consensus, but which has passed into history, is in the colonial context.
The second exception is undemocratic, authoritarian regimes, which are
not "representative," thus not providing the opportunity for the "people"
to participate effectively in the political and economic life of the state,
especially when there is a pattern of flagrant violations of human
rights. This is the exception recognized by President Clinton in his
Quebec speech, as noted earlier, and by the Supreme Court of Canada.
Along with the substantive criteria,'°5 it seems essential to consider
suitable procedures-weighted majority in favor of secession and
waiting period between secessionist referenda, for example-as well.1"
Professors Paul Williams and Michael Scharf have recently applied
102. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
or Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/47/135, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 911 (1993).
103. Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities, Feb. 1, 1995, § II, art. 5, reproduced in 34 I.L.M. 351, 354 (1995) ("Without
prejudice to measures taken in pursuance of their general integration policy, the Parties
shall refrain from policies or practices aimed at assimilation of persons belonging to
national minorities against their will and shall protect these persons from any actions
aimed at such assimilation.").
104. Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Report of the CSCE Meeting
of Experts on National Minorities, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1692, 1695 (1991).
105. Margaret Moore examines the just cause, choice and national self-determination
theories of secession in The Ethics of Secession and a Normative Theory of Nationalism,
13 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 225 (Jul. 2000). See also MARGARET MOORE, NATIONAL SELF-
DETERMINATION AND SECESSION (1998).
106. Daniel M. Weinstock discusses these in Toward a Proceduralist Theory of
Secession, 13 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 251 (Jul. 2000).
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a useful approach in the Nagorno Karabagh/Azerbaijan situation,
combining "intermediate sovereignty" and "earned recognition" to
achieve self-determination. 7 Intermediate sovereignty contemplates a
negotiated grant of a level of sovereignty for a period, during which both
sides would establish a system of protection of human rights and
minority rights and "engage in a series of defined confidence building
measures. " 108 This would take place with the support of the
international community in preparation for full independence. Earned
recognition would follow, including a process of determination by an
international mechanism to give effect to the latter of two referenda
within Nagorno Karabagh, with the final result being recognition by the
international community as an independent state. 1 9
To reiterate, we have not heard the last of secession. The need to
clarify both substantive and procedural criteria for determination of the
validity of secessionist claims is paramount.
107. Memorandum Prepared by the PUB. INrfL LAW & POLY GROUP and the NEW ENG.
CTR. FOR INT'L LAW & POL'Y, The Nagorno Karabagh Crisis: A Blueprint for Resolution,
(June 2000), available at httpJ/www.nesl.edu/center/pubs.nagorno.pdf (last visited Oct.
31, 2001) (on file with the Denver Journal of International Law & Policy).
108. Id. at 41.
109. Id.
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